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social and biological sciences. It has been shown that, without suitable mechanisms, high levels of
cooperation/contributions in repeated public goods games are not stable in the long run. Reputation,
as a driver of indirect reciprocity, is often proposed as a mechanism that leads to cooperation. A simple
and prominent reputation dynamic function through scoring: contributing behaviour increases one’s
score, non-contributing reduces it. Indeed, many experiments have established that scoring can sustain
cooperation in two-player prisoner’s dilemmas and donation games. However, these prior studies focused
on pairwise interactions, with no experiment studying reputation mechanisms in more general group
interactions. In this paper, we focus on groups and scores, proposing and testing several scoring rules
that could apply to multi-player prisoners’ dilemmas played in groups, which we test in a laboratory
experiment. Results are unambiguously negative: we observe a steady decline of cooperation for every
tested scoring mechanism. All scoring systems suffer from it in much the same way. We conclude that
the positive results obtained by scoring in pairwise interactions do not apply to multi-player prisoner’s
dilemmas, and that alternative mechanisms are needed.
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Cooperation among unrelated individuals in social-dilemma-type situations
is a key topic in social and biological sciences. It has been shown that,
without suitable mechanisms, high levels of cooperation/contributions in
repeated public goods games are not stable in the long run. Reputation, as
a driver of indirect reciprocity, is often proposed as a mechanism
that leads to cooperation. A simple and prominent reputation dynamic func-
tion through scoring: contributing behaviour increases one’s score, non-
contributing reduces it. Indeed, many experiments have established that
scoring can sustain cooperation in two-player prisoner’s dilemmas and
donation games. However, these prior studies focused on pairwise inter-
actions, with no experiment studying reputation mechanisms in more
general group interactions. In this paper, we focus on groups and scores,
proposing and testing several scoring rules that could apply to multi-
player prisoners’ dilemmas played in groups, which we test in a laboratory
experiment. Results are unambiguously negative: we observe a steady
decline of cooperation for every tested scoring mechanism. All scoring sys-
tems suffer from it in much the same way. We conclude that the positive
results obtained by scoring in pairwise interactions do not apply to multi-
player prisoner’s dilemmas, and that alternative mechanisms are needed.
1. Introduction
Social dilemmas are situations where the optimal decision from the perspective
of a self-interested individual conflicts with what is optimal for the group col-
lectively. Examples include public goods [1] and common-pool resources
situations [2], as modelled using game theory via, for example, prisoner’s
dilemmas (PD), voluntary contributions games [3,4] or donation games [5].
The common feature of these interactions is that in the absence of a suitable
mechanism [6,7] and given insufficient foresight by the players [8,9], the only
stable outcome coincides with the socially undesirable one, i.e. absence of
cooperation.1 The players fail to cooperate and, as a result, are all worse off
than in the collective optimum; a phenomenon often referred to as the ‘tragedy
of the commons’ [10,11] or the ‘free riding dilemma’ [12].
One of the most important mechanisms that successfully implements
cooperation is ‘reciprocity’ [13,14]. Reciprocity is a behaviour whereby people
return benefits for benefits (and hostility with hostility) [15]. Thus, cooperation
breeds cooperation and may lead to higher pay-offs in the long run, if people
resist the momentary benefits of defection (which, instead, breeds more defec-
tion and eventually leads to low pay-offs). Commonly, one distinguishes
between direct and indirect reciprocity. Direct reciprocity assumes that a
player would cooperate with another person expecting him to do the same in
return [16]; under indirect reciprocity, instead, a person does not expect the
recipient of his help to reciprocate, but he expects that someone else will [5]:
‘the recipients of an act of kindness are more likely to help in turn, even
if the person who benefits from their generosity is somebody else’ [17].
& 2018 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.
A principal driver of indirect reciprocity is reputation [18],
therefore considered as a ‘universal currency’ [19]: cooperat-
ing, or refusing to do so and choosing to defect, affects not
only one’s stage-game pay-off but also one’s reputation.
When interacting again in the future, players will take each
others’ reputations into account, thus indirectly reciprocating
players who have a good reputation (i.e. that have cooperated
in the past). This creates incentives to cooperate beyond
the momentary temptations of defection, provided the
future benefits of cooperation are substantial. As a result,
cooperation may emerge in the presence of suitable
reputation mechanisms.
Indeed, reputation—via numerous implementations—has
been shown to stabilize high levels of cooperative behaviour
in controlled experiments involving human subjects [20–22].
However, an important limitation of prior studies has been
the focus on pairwise interactions, while in reality most
social interactions unfold in groups [23] involving team
production [24]. Producing in teams is particularly relevant
in present society as interactions increasingly take place
online, involving largely impersonal, crowd interactions.
Moving from pairwise interactions to group interactions
substantially complicates matters in theory and in practice.
In a group interaction, players might not be able to observe
the actions undertaken by others individually, thus making
it harder to track and update other players’ reputations.
Other than in a two-person interaction, one can often not
infer the others’ individual actions from the aggregated
outcome. For instance, when playing a public good game,
information regarding individual behaviours may not be
available, and the only available information may concern
the group as a whole.
This raises the following question: how do reputation
mechanisms fare in group interactions? More specifically, as
a first step towards addressing the question more generally,
we shall here investigate one of the best-known and simplest
mechanisms for reputation called ‘scoring’. Our analysis of
‘group scoring’ extends the concept of ‘image scoring’
[25,26], as has been studied widely in pairwise interactions.
Under image scoring [5,27], each player has a score (starting
at 0) as a proxy for his reputation. Whenever a player has the
opportunity to cooperate with someone else, his score is
updated: if he cooperates, his score is increased by one, if
not it is decreased by one. Thus a player’s reputation is con-
tinuously reassessed based on the past (in the simplest case,
based on the previous decision). A seminal theory result [27]
is that the strategy to cooperate with anybody with a non-
negative image score is evolutionary stable. Crucially, by
refusing to cooperate with someone with a low image score
a player is decreasing his own score, thus reducing his own
probability of receiving cooperation in the future. Hence,
not cooperating with a player with a low image score can
be interpreted as a form of punishment. Indeed, in practice,
numerous behavioural experiments show that image scoring
helps stabilize cooperative behaviour in two-player PDs and
donation games [26,28–30].
As we extend scoring mechanisms to group interactions
more generally, and to multi-player PDs in particular, we
increase the degree of freedom regarding the scoring rules
that may apply. Real-world group interactions vary with
respect to the information that is available, and typically indi-
viduals do not observe all actions undertaken by all other
individuals, especially in large groups. The relevant scoring
mechanism that applies to a specific group interaction
therefore depends on how much information is available to
players and how much information each reputation rule
requires, as processing the available information correctly
may become difficult in larger interactions. Indeed, a conjec-
ture [19] for why image scoring is favoured over other
reputation dynamics is that (relatively) little information is
required to implement it under full feedback [31]. As such,
with limited [32] or partially erroneous feedback [33],
sufficiently accurate information is key for mechanism
success.
When interacting in groups, information becomes coarser
and a single subject may thus find it harder to reap the
benefits of ‘reputation-building’, and cooperation may there-
fore unravel. Recent theory has extended ‘scoring’ methods to
group interactions [34]. The baseline establishes a positive
cooperation result for the case of image scoring in group
interactions.2 Furthermore, when only information regarding
group performance—but not regarding individual players—
is available, ‘group scores’ replace image scores: each player’s
group score summarizes the aggregate cooperativeness of the
groups to which he belonged in the past, without any
additional information regarding what players did individu-
ally. In this case, theory predicts that cooperation cannot be
sustained.
In this paper, we provide the first test of this theory in a
group setting considering various informational contexts.
Hence, as a first step towards addressing this question
more generally, we investigate whether different scoring
mechanisms can sustain cooperation in experimental multi-
player PDs. In particular, we consider a simple and widely
used implementation for scoring mechanisms based on ‘Mar-
kovian’ scores, that is, scores that depend only on players’
actions from the previous period (memory 1). The basic
model we consider is an individual-level binary3 Markovian
‘image score’, as investigated theoretically in numerous prior
studies (e.g. [5,25,35–39]). For such scores, theory predicts
that high levels of cooperation can stabilize, and there exists
experimental evidence confirming this in the context of
pairwise interaction [32,40]. In fact, concerning the role
of memory, existing experimental evidence [40] suggests
that Markovian memory already leads to high levels of
cooperation and that longer memory increases cooperation
further. The goal of the present paper is to investigate
whether, for the case of the Markovian baseline, the positive
results that were obtained for pairwise interactions carry over
to group interactions.
For this, we conducted an extensive laboratory exper-
iment. The baseline is to test image scoring. In addition,
we test alternative scoring rules that could apply to group
interactions including one where players score each other
endogenously through votes. The proposed rules differ
with respect to how much information regarding past behav-
iour of their group-mates is required, ranging from no
feedback to full feedback.
The experimental results concerning cooperation are
negative: for every scoring mechanism, we observe a steady
decline in cooperative behaviour. The decay of cooperation
is the same under every mechanism and comparable even
with the case when no scoring mechanism is implemented
at all. We conclude that positive results regarding cooperation
deriving from scoring, as were repeatedly observed in two-









Our results confirm the negative theoretical prediction
with respect to coarse group scoring but falsify the positive
prediction regarding image scoring in groups.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Next, we
present the experimental procedure, followed by our results.
The Material and methods section contains additional details
concerning experimental design and statistical analyses.
2. Results
Before presenting results, we briefly discuss the structure of
the experiment and introduce the different scoring mechan-
isms that were tested. For further detail concerning the
experimental design, we refer the reader to the Material
and methods section and the electronic supplementary
material.
2.1. Experimental procedure
Our experiment involved 192 subjects playing several,
repeated multi-player PDs, resulting in a total of 11 520 on
whether to cooperate or not. The experiment had 12 sessions
involving 16 subjects each; each session consisted of three
different treatments, each played for blocks of 20 rounds
(phases). In each treatment, subjects were faced with a differ-
ent scoring mechanism and treatments differed according to
which and in which order the following mechanisms were
implemented.
2.2. Scoring mechanisms
Scoring mechanisms range between image scoring, providing
full feedback about other player’s actions, and no scoring,
providing no feedback at all (a summary of all the scoring
mechanisms is provided in table 1):
— No scoring. Subjects receive no information at all regarding
the past actions of the other players, and therefore it is the
treatment with the lowest informational content. Expec-
tation: in this implementation of a repeated multi-player
PD, we expect a decay of cooperation resulting in low
contribution levels, as shown by numerous previous
experiments [26,30,31,41] mainly conducted in voluntary
contribution games settings.
— Image scoring. This is the treatment with the highest infor-
mational content of all, equivalent to the case with a
binary image score in two-player interactions. Players
are told whether their past and future group-mates
cooperated in the previous round. Expectation: based on
previous experiments on donation games [41] and on
theoretical results [34], one could expect a stable high
level of cooperation.
— Group scoring. Scoring proceeds as in image scoring, except
that all group members receive the same score based on the
number of cooperators in their group. Subjects are given no
direct information about individual decisions. Expectation:
recent theoretical work [34] suggests that a low level of
cooperative behaviour is to be expected.
— Self-scoring. Players directly assign the score to their fellow
players based on feedback regarding own pay-offs and
aggregate contributions in their group. This treatment
might contain more or less information than group scoring
depending on whether players are truthful when assigning
the scores. Expectation: in this case, the only Nash equili-
brium is for nobody to contribute, independently of the
assigned ratings.
— Image self-scoring. This is a control treatment for self- and
image scoring, where scores are exogenously assigned
as if all the players were truthful in the self-scoring treat-
ment. The resulting informational content is, in principle,
equivalent to image scoring, but provided in a slightly
more complicated format.
Every round, subjects were randomly reshuffled and
rematched into groups of size 4 and provided with scores
feedback, in particular of their group-mates, calculated
using the current scoring rule. After deciding whether to
cooperate or not, subjects received their personal individual
pay-off feedback (thus knowing how many people
cooperated in their group) and were assigned updated scores.
It is important to note that, by virtue of our design, the score
of a subject only reflected his last action, and that scores did not
carry over multiple rounds of the game. Our focus is on situ-
ations where mechanisms are introduced or where a new
mechanism replaces an old one. Hence, subjects in our exper-
iments always initially played a treatment were no feedback
about others’ actions or scores was given (Initial phase). After
that, two different scoring mechanisms were played in succes-
sion (scoring phase 1 and scoring phase 2); see table 2 for the
combinations of treatments played during the experiment.
Table 1. Summary of scoring mechanisms: the table summarizes how
much information about other players’ actions in the previous round was
provided to the players. Regardless of the treatment, all subjects were
given feedback regarding the profit made during the round (and hence on
the number of contributors in their group).
treatment feedback provided
no scoring no feedback about other players’ actions
image scoring feedback about individual actions of others




same as image scoring (control for self- and
image scoring)
Table 2. Combinations of treatments played during the experiment: each
row details one of the six treatment combinations in the experiment.
Each combination was played twice (in two different experimental sessions).
treatments’ combinations
initial phase! scoring phase 1! scoring phase 2
(round 1–20) (round 21–40) (round 41–60)
control treat. no scoring ! no scoring ! no scoring
treat. com. 1 no scoring ! image scoring ! group scoring
treat. com. 2 no scoring ! group scoring ! image scoring
treat. com. 3 no scoring ! image scoring ! self-scoring
treat. com. 4 no scoring ! image self-scoring ! self-scoring










In figure 1, we show the percentage of cooperators as a
function of time for all the different treatments.4 For all treat-
ments, we observe a steady decline in cooperation; the decay
occurs in much the same way, independent of the order in
which the different treatments were played.5
Even though there are significant statistical differences
between some of the observed downward trends (e.g. image
scoring is significantly different from no scoring, see table 3),
the main difference in treatments can be reduced to a slight
offset in the initial percentage of contributors. Figure 2 illus-
trates that the estimated (linear) decay of cooperation over
time occurs at the same speed. Indeed, all the slopes are
within the error range of each other. The only notable differ-
ence regards the intercept, that is, the initial contributions
(figure 2b).
For more details on the statistical analysis, we refer the
reader to the Material and methods section.
The above results indicate that the scoring mechanisms
considered here, even ones that were shown to stabilize
high level of cooperation in two-player games (i.e. image
scoring), fail to achieve positive results in multi-player inter-
actions. The most plausible explanation is that it is harder to
isolate the ‘bad apples’ in a group interaction, resulting in a
deterioration of the quality of scores, as perceived by subjects.
This kind of imprecision destabilizes cooperation: to keep
stable levels of cooperation, players should—on average—
cooperate with a frequency at least as high as the observed
number of players with a high score in their group, thus
maintaining a stable percentage of cooperators in the popu-
lation. Instead, we observe that, while, ceteris paribus,
players do cooperate more with an increased observed
score in their group, they do so with a (downward) bias,
especially for high sums of scores in the group.6 Figure 3
illustrates the case of image and group scoring7: in the pic-
ture, we can see that players cooperate less than 80% (on
average) of what they should cooperate in order to obtain
stable cooperation. This behaviour is also confirmed by an
analysis of individual decision making: subjects positively
react to observed high scores in their group, but they do
not ‘reciprocate’ enough for cooperation to be stable. A
formal model and analysis of the players’ decision making
is presented in the electronic supplementary material.
Further contributing to the steady decline of cooperation is
the fact that when a high-score player decides not to cooperate
because of the presence of low-score subjects in his group, this
reduces the score of all his group-mates, not just of the
low-score individuals. This results in a steady decay of players
with good reputation and cooperative behaviour in the
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scoring phase 2(a) (b)
Figure 1. Percentage of cooperation as a function of time for all the treatments: (a) and (b) the contribution levels observed during the first and second scoring
phases of the experiment, respectively. The black line in the background shows the average cooperation observed in the initial phase. As first treatment subjects
(i.e. in the initial phase) always played the treatment with no scoring mechanism, it can be treated as a baseline. The grey area represents the binomial proportion
confidence interval [42]. The figures show a steady decline in average cooperation. The decline happens in much the same way for all treatments, and independent
of the order in which the different treatments were played. (Online version in colour.)
Table 3. Pairwise Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon rank sum tests. The table shows the p-values obtained from the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for
each pair of treatments. The test was performed only on first-period decisions and excluding the initial phase of every session. Red p-values indicate a
statistically significant difference (with dark red when p, 0.05 and light red when p , 0.1) while a black p-value indicates no significant difference. (Online
version in colour.)
no scoring image scoring group scoring self-scoring image self-scoring
no scoring n.a. 0.063 0.651 0.043 0.029
image scoring 0.063 n.a. 0.158 0.870 0.741
group scoring 0.651 0.158 n.a. 0.115 0.082
self-scoring 0.043 0.870 0.115 n.a. 0.867









contributions, as observed by Fischbacher et al. [47] in a
study on (imperfect) conditional cooperation in a public
goods experiment.
3. Discussion
Scoring methods in general, and image scoring in particular,
are simple implementations of reputation mechanisms.
They stabilize cooperative behaviour in various standard,
two-player social dilemma situations, such as in PD or
donation games. Image scoring requires reliable feedback
regarding individual-level behaviour. The purpose of this
study is to extend such mechanisms to group interactions,
in particular to multi-player PD with or without full indi-
vidual feedback. We propose several scoring rules that
could apply in this setting, depending on informational con-
text, and test them in a laboratory experiment. Furthermore,
we investigate how an endogenized scoring mechanism
could be implemented. The results are unambiguously
negative: independent of information, feedback and scoring
mechanism, cooperation decays. This includes mechanisms
that were previously shown to stabilize cooperation in cor-
responding two-player cases. A plausible explanation is
that individuals cannot be isolated; i.e. defectors cannot be
individually punished, and cooperators cannot be individu-
ally rewarded. This results in a reaction to the average
group score that is increasingly biased towards defection,
therefore leading to a steady decrease of high-reputation
players in the population that in turn begets lower levels
of cooperative behaviour.
On a broader level, our results show that there is still much
that we do not know about reputation dynamics. Even though
indirect reciprocity is considered one of the main mechanisms
through which cooperation can be sustained, there have been
very few studies on interactions in group setting. Understand-
ing such settings has become particularly relevant in recent
years because, due to the increasing digitalization of our
world, more and more interactions take place online where
people frequently communicate via crowd platforms and
where often explicit reputation tallying is provided as a
method to build trust. Owing to the increasing decentraliza-
tion of interactions, partial or total anonymity of the actors
involved can be the norm and reputation is often built on a
peer-to-peer basis with members of communities rating each
other. For example, a project may involve several groups of
individuals, and information on individual level contributions
could be imperfectly filtered via several community-layers
before reaching the players. With this work, we set up to
investigate some of these issues.
A key conclusion is that many positive results on
cooperation, as have been observed in pairwise interactions,













































Figure 2. Estimated decays of cooperative behaviour. In figure (a), each coloured line illustrates the fitted linear function of a treatment. The grey areas depict the
95% confidence interval. The black line depicts the estimated decay for the entire dataset. Table (b) lists the values obtained for the various slope estimators. There
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contributors as a function of scores
Figure 3. Percentage of cooperators as a function of the observed score in their
group. The figure shows how many players contributed to the common pool of
their group as a function of the sum of the scores in the group. Black and grey
illustrate the image scoring and group scoring cases, respectively. The error bars
indicate the 95% binomial proportion confidence interval computed using
Wilson score intervals [42]. The continuous red line depicts the percentage of
cooperations in the no scoring treatment as a function of what would have
been the observed score (see the electronic supplementary material for more
details); the grey area represents the 95% confidence interval. The figure
shows that, even though players cooperate significantly more when the observed
sum of scores increases, they do so with a downward bias, when compared with
the identity line, especially for high-score values; decisions below the identity
line will result in a steady reduction of ‘good players’ in the population, thus
lowering the average score and resulting in a spiralling down of cooperative









There are numerous avenues for future work and many
open questions; for example: are dynamics of play in multi-
player games fundamentally different from two-player games
(as it might be the case for direct reciprocity, see e.g. [48–50])?
And if so, could one exploit this to devise a scoring mechanism
that is able to sustain higher levels of cooperation? How does
group size matter? Could the combination of multiple mechan-
isms, such as scoring and punishment, lead to higher
cooperation? Could the deterioration of the quality of scores
be compensated by cumulating the scores over multiple
rounds, letting players ‘build’ their reputation? Future work
should address such issues andmanyothers, as group structures
are an important, ubiquitous aspect of human society.
4. Material and methods
4.1. The experiment
The experiment was conducted as an experiment on interactive
decision-making at the ETH Decision Science Laboratory
(DeSciL) in Zurich using the z-Tree [51] software. We ran 12
sessions with 16 participants in each session, for a total of 192
participants. Participants were recruited from the joint subject
pool of ETH Zurich and University of Zurich using the hroot
[52] sofware and mainly consisted of university students. All pro-
cedures adhered to DeSciL’s Operational Rules8; additional
ethics approval was waived following standard DeSciL protocol
for members of the laboratory’s Review Board. In no way at all
does the experiment violate the ethical principles of the Declara-
tion of Helsinki, and subjects were properly incentivized by
converting their earnings in real currency with full transparency
(i.e. no deception). Each session in the laboratory lasted roughly
1 h during which the players played three treatments for 20
rounds each. On average, subjects earned 33 CHF (roughly 33
USD at the time), with a range of 25 to 40 CHF, including a
5 CHF show-up fee.
First, subjects always played the treatment where no infor-
mation regarding the past behaviour was provided. After that,
subjects played two of the other scoring treatments. The table
below details the treatments’ combinations.
At the beginning of the session and before each treatment,
subjects were given written instructions9 explaining what the
experiment was about and the game that they were about to
play, scoring mechanism included. Before the first treatment, sub-
jects were given someminutes to familiarize with the gamewith a
small training. Before the truthful self-scoring treatment, because
of the complexity of the scoring mechanism, subjects also had
some minutes to understand how the scoring worked using a
score simulator. Screenshots displaying the different treatments
can be found in the electronic supplementary material.
As customary, subjects were incentivized by converting their
earnings in real currency. Subjects on average earned 33 CHF
(roughly 33 USD), including 5 CHF of show-up fee. Earnings
ranged from 25 to 40 CHF.
In the following, we define the game that the subjects played
in the experiment and the scoring mechanisms that were used.
4.1.1. N-players prisoner’s dilemma
The subject played the following game whose aspects were all
common knowledge:
(1) At the beginning of each round (for 20 rounds), N subjects
(N ¼ jnj where n; f1, . . ., 16g) are randomly assigned to
four groups of fixed size four.
(2) Every subject decides whether to contribute his endowment
to the common pool (i.e. whether to cooperate). For player
i[n, let ci ¼ 0 and ci ¼ 1 denote whether player i cooperated
or not. Starting from the second round of play, players are
shown the scores assigned to all players in the previous
round. Furthermore, players learn the score of their
group-mates in the current round.
(3) Subjects receive individual pay-off f according to





(4) Scoring: a score is assigned to each player based on his
contribution and depending on the treatment. The score is
visible to the other subjects in the following round and it
replaces the score from the previous round.
Regardless of the treatment, all subjects were shown the
profit that they made during the round and during the entire
session; thus each subject was told how many people cooperated
in his group in the previous round.
4.1.2. The scoring mechanisms
Depending on treatment, a different score was assigned to each
subject. The score was not cumulative over rounds and, every
round, subjects were only shown the scores (if any) as were
assigned in the previous round. The scoring mechanisms
were designed so that the score ranged between 0 and 1 for
all treatments.
— No scoring. No score was assigned to players during this
treatment.
— Image scoring. Subjects were assigned a score of 1 if they
cooperated in the previous round and 0 if not.
— Group scoring. Subjects were assigned a score proportional to
how many people in their group contributed to the common
pool. The score equalled the number of cooperators in their
group divided by the group size (4); thus subjects in the
same group all received the same score. More precisely, the






principle, the higher subject i’s score, the higher is the prob-
ability that i invested in the group account. If the resulting
score is 1 or 0, the group score faultlessly indicates whether
a subject cooperated or not, respectively.
— Self-scoring. Each subject was asked to rate his/her group
awarding a number of stars ranging from 0 to 3. The score of
each subject was computed as the sum of all the stars awarded
to the group by his group-mates (excluding his own rating)
divided by 9 (i.e. the maximum number of stars that a player
could be assigned). Therefore, indicating with wj[f0, 1, 2, 3g
the score assigned by player j in group Gi to his group, the






w j. Hence, the score of each subject ranges
between 0 (all his group-mates awarded no stars to the group)
and 1 (all his group-mates awarded three stars to the group).
— Image self-scoring: The score was assigned as in the self-scor-
ing treatment but exogenously. This means that each subject
was considered as having awarded a number of stars to his
group equal to the number of cooperators (excluding himself )
observed in his group. More precisely, for a group Gi we
denote with ui[f0, 1, 2, 3g the sum of the players cooperating
in Gi as observed by player i; i.e. ui ;
P
j[Gi ,j=i
c j. The score si






u j. Hence, each score ranges between 0 (all
players in that group defected) to 1 (each player in that
group cooperated).
4.2. Statistical analysis
To determine if treatments significantly differ from one another,
we used the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon rank sum test [53,54].
Owing to (possible) autocorrelations between same-session









first period. Furthermore, we exclude from the analysis decisions
taken during the initial phase. Let xqi[f0, 1g denote the decision
that player i took during the first period of treatment q. We obtain
xq ; {x
q
1, . . . ,x
q
m} where m is the number of players that played
treatment q (excluding the initial phase). We perform a rank
sum test for each pair of treatments: the p-value obtained from
the test is a measure of how likely it is that xi and x j are drawn
from the same distribution with the same mode. Table 3 shows
the p-values for each pair of treatments in the first and
second scoring phase of the experiment. A value depicted in
red indicates that the two treatments significantly differ from
each other.
To obtain figure 2, we performed a linear regression of the
contributions to the public good as a function of time for each
treatment individually and for all of them combined. An alterna-
tive analysis, using a random resampling permutation test, is
available in the electronic supplementary material. In the elec-
tronic supplementary material, we also provide a model for the
decision making of the individual player and fit it to our data.
The obtained results are compatible with the ones presented in
this manuscript.
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Endnotes
1In the remainder of this document, we will use cooperate as a
common terminology for related terms like contribute, donate and
exert effort
2I.e. when full information regarding individual decisions is
provided.
3Meaning that the score of a player can only have two values, e.g. 0
and 1.
4More detailed plots are available in the electronic supplementary
material.
5This decay is in line with similar patterns known from multi-player
public goods games (see e.g. [4,43–46]).
6It is important to note that this effect relies on the players being able
to observe the scores in their group. If this is not the case, like in the
‘no scoring’ treatment, no such effect is observed. See the electronic
supplementary material for more information.
7See the electronic supplementary material for the other cases.
8These implement the standards of behavioural economics including
no deception, compatible incentives and payment, minimal earnings,
rights to terminate experiments at any time, data anonymity and
confidentiality
9Available in the electronic supplementary material.
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